We attempt to identify the impact of immigration on the labour market opportunities of resident workers by analysing data from the Greek Labour Force Survey (1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013)(2014)(2015) as well as census data for 1981, 1991, and 2001. Slicing the national labour market into education and experience segments, we find modest adverse effects on the employment outcomes of natives and usually insignificant effects on earnings. Our results are generally robust to alternative definitions of skill groups and the potential "downgrading" of immigrants. Importantly, we obtain similar results in qualitative terms when we account for potential endogenous selection into skillcells, by implementing an instrumental variables approach in the spirit of Card (2001). We also show that veteran immigrants compete more heavily with natives than recent immigrants do. In addition, our analysis indicates that the effects of immigration were economically more important during the Greek crisis. Finally, the evidence supports the idea that migrants push natives towards complementary, non-routine tasks.
Introduction
Several studies analysing public attitudes towards immigration indicate that the majority of the less-skilled natives in the United States and Europe have been taking a stand against laissez-faire immigration policies because they anticipate that migrant workers will deteriorate their labour market opportunities (see e.g. Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002) . Recently, the global recession and the refugee crisis in 2015 have revived Malthusian fears and have further fuelled negative sentiments against migrants among natives. Not surprisingly, the impact of immigration on domestic workers dominates the public discourse in Greece as well, especially after the outburst of the 2009 Greek sovereign debt crisis and its dramatic labour market consequences.
From a theoretical perspective, immigration can have both negative and positive effects on the labour market outcomes of natives. On the one hand, assuming skill diversity within the working age population, the partial equilibrium model of the labour market suggests that the effect of migration hinges on whether it changes the balance of skills in the host country. For instance, if migrants are relatively less-educated than natives, immigration is expected to exert a negative influence on the labour market outcomes of the less-skilled nativeborn population (see e.g. Altonji and Card 1991; Dustmann, Fabbri, and Preston 2005; Card 2009 ).
On the other hand, as argued by Ottaviano and Peri (2012) ; Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2012) , natives and migrants are not necessarily perfect substitutes in the labour market. As a result, immigration is expected to help the employment of natives by generating complementarities in production. What is more, these authors contend that the response of physical capital to the supply shock in the medium and long term can attenuate any adverse effects felt immediately upon migrants' arrival (or even restore employment and wagesthe adjustment of the economy through a reduction in native employment rather than through earnings, as reported in Borjas (2003) . What is more, Greece's foreign population is relatively homogeneous in terms of both origin and educational attainment. For instance, almost 45 % stem from the contiguous Albania. At the same time, compared to traditional immigration countries, the majority of migrants in Greece are less skilled. For example, the percentage of tertiary educated migrants was 17.1 % in 2001, while in the English-speaking countries their share ranges between 35 % and 59 % (see Bratti and Conti 2017) . Consequently, indirect complementarities between different skill-level and ethnic groups, suggested by several US studies (see e.g. Peri 2006, 2012) might be questionable, thereby rendering the partial effects of immigration of particular importance.
In addition, our paper also contributes to the literature on immigration and the supply of tasks of natives. As already discussed above, the previous literature suggests that migrants push natives towards complementary, non-manual tasks (Peri and Sparber 2009 ). Yet, as argued by D'Amuri and Peri (2014) , this mechanism is country-specific and depends, among other factors, on the strictness of employment regulation legislation (EPL) that influences occupational mobility. Hence, it cannot be easily generalized to other countries and might vary according to the level of institutional development. Our study constitutes an attempt to provide further insight regarding this complex issue. To that end, we employ data on the task content of occupations from Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2010) . Lastly, in stark contrast to most of the previous literature, we also pay attention to the potential endogenous clustering of migrants into skill-cells where the labour demand is strong. To that aim, we adopt the "shift-share" methodology, in the spirit of Card (2001) , exploiting the historical distribution of migrants in order to generate exogenous variation.
Slicing the Greek labour market into education and work experience segments à la Borjas (2003) , our analysis produces the following results. Overall, immigration raises the natives' unemployment to labour force ratio, and lowers their employment relative to the population. The effects on monthly earnings and average hours are also negative, but not always significant. The evidence is stronger when the census data are employed. These findings survive a battery of important robustness tests, including an exhaustive set of alternative skill definitions and effective schooling and work experience of migrants. The estimates also indicate that natives compete more heavily with veteran immigrants (i.e. those who have lived in Greece for at least 10 years). Importantly, the results remain qualitatively intact when employing a 2SLS approach, though the sign pattern of the estimated coefficients changes as far as the earnings equations are concerned. The comparison of the results before and during the great recession indicates that only the effects on employment become quantitatively more important during a recession. Finally, our findings corroborate with existing evidence that natives reallocate towards non-routine tasks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we offer some key immigration facts in Greece. Section 3 describes the data, explains our empirical method and offers some preliminary evidence. Section 4 reports and discusses the empirical results of the skill-cell analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. On average, immigrants are less educated than natives. Based on our LFS data for 2015, about 42 % of the foreign-born population have lower secondary or less education, compared to 36.5 % of natives. On the other hand, the fraction of immigrants with a university education (16 %) falls short of the native share (22 %) by about six percentage points. Immigrants are also relatively younger than natives. More precisely, the foreignborn average age appears to be 38.6 compared to the native-born average age of 41.5.
Regarding the occupational distribution of natives and immigrants, two patterns emerge clearly (see Table  1 ). First, newly arrived immigrants -that is, those who have lived for nine or fewer years in Greece -are overrepresented in medium and low-skilled occupations, regardless of their level of education. For instance, 51 % of the less-skilled male migrants and 36 % of university graduates fall into the craft and related trades workers group, while nearly 25 % and 12 %, respectively, are employed in elementary occupations. Of course, this pattern may in part be attributable to the fact that recent migrants lack language proficiency and other country-specific skills which hampers an efficient labour market match. Second, after a considerable length of time (i.e. after 10 or more years in Greece) the occupational distribution of migrants, though it is still far from being regarded as absolutely identical with that of natives, tends to converge. Using data from Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2010) , we illustrate in Figure 2 how routine task intensity evolved during the period 1999-2015, for natives and immigrants separately. This measure is intended to reflect the degree of the routinization of tasks and is defined as the ratio between the average routine and complex content of tasks within occupations. Routine tasks require "repetitive physical strength and non-complex cognitive skills." Complex tasks are defined as the sum of abstract and service tasks. Abstract tasks are "complex problem solving," service tasks are "caring for others." 9 As we observe, the pattern depicted in this figure corroborates with the one outlined above, as natives and migrants appear to specialize in different tasks. The discrepancy could possibly be attributed to the fact that foreigners have, on average, fewer formal qualifications than their native-born counterparts. Bearing in mind that migrants become more "similar" to natives as they accumulate country-specific skills (as implied by the descriptive evidence shown in Table 1 ), we can reasonably assume that the trend in migrants' involvement in routine tasks is mainly driven by inflows of recent migrants rather than stocks. This is reinforced by the fact that the recent slowdown in migrant flows, since the outburst of the Greek crisis, is accompanied by a declining trend in the index of routine task intensity. 10
Figure 2:
Routine task intensity, natives and immigrants. Authors' calculations on GRLFS data matched with data reported by Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2010) . Higher values indicate greater specialization in manual/routine tasks.
Data and Methodology
Following common practice in recent immigration studies (see e.g. Borjas 2003; Carrasco, Jimeno, and Ortega 2008; Steinhardt 2011; Ortega and Verdugo 2014; Edo 2015) we report results relying on weighted ordinary least-squares (WLS) estimates of the following empirical model: 11
where is the value of the mean labour market outcome for Greek workers in cell (i, j, t), namely the mean log monthly wage, deflated to 2010 euros by using the CPI series (downloaded from the AMECO database, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie-/SelectSerie.cfm) the unemployment to labour force ratio, the employment to population ratio, and the average hours worked; is a vector of dummies indicating the educational attainment, is a vector of experience dummies, is a vector of time dummies, ( × ) stands for the interaction between education and experience fixed effects, ( × ) is the interaction between education and year fixed effects, and ( × ) is the interaction between experience and year fixed effects.
Since the wage variable is only reported in bands and not as a continuous variable until 2014, we follow a common intermediate solution in the literature and attribute to every individual the median value of each interval. To deal with a typical top-coding issue, in line with Monastiriotis (2014, 2016) we calculate the upper limit as the lower limit of the open interval plus the width of the closed intervals. 12 These authors have shown that this modification yields robust results when using the GRLFS data. Table 11 in the Appendix details how many income brackets there are for every year analysed in this study, the attributed wage, and how individuals are spread among them.
Estimating a very saturated model with the full set of fixed effects, this guarantees that we avoid spurious correlations between the employment outcomes and the immigration share variable. 13 However, a potential threat to the validity of our identification strategy is reverse causality, insofar as migrants cluster from the origin countries into those cells where labour demand is stronger. While most of the existing studies rely on fixed effects regressions, as in Borjas (2003) , acknowledging that in the event of endogeneity the national approach yields a lower bound on the true effect of migration, this study goes beyond correlations, by offering instrumental variable estimates as well. To that aim, we adopt the "shift-share" methodology, in the spirit of Card (2001) . On the other hand, our analysis is based on the premise that natives cannot self-select into cells where wages or the probability of employment are higher, at least in the short-term, as potential skill upgrading needs considerable time to materialize. 14 Our examination of the impact of immigration on the labour market outcomes of natives relies on data drawn from two different samples. In particular, we use data from the Greek Labour Force Survey (GRLFS) over the 1999-2015 period; and the 10 % census of population in 1981, 1991, and 2001 , drawn from the International Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-I). 15 The GRLFS is an annual household, cross-sectional survey containing information for about 250,000 individuals. Its main advantage is that it allows us to construct a pseudo-panel with a high time-series dimension, thereby making the statistical inference more meaningful. On the other hand, our census data contain more than 3,000,000 individual observations. As a result, population figures are more precisely estimated, and thus, the estimates based on this sample are less likely to suffer from the so-called attenuation bias. 16 Another important improvement is that the allocation of migrants in 1991 might be considered more exogenous, since the flows were sudden and unexpected, and migrants did not have enough time to self-select into those cells (and regions) which offer better employment opportunities. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the estimates based on the annual variations of the variables under consideration should be interpreted as the short-run impacts of immigration. By contrast, the results obtained from regressions which use census data should be considered as reflecting the long-run elasticity of the employment outcomes with respect to immigration.
We classify the labour force into four education categories, namely primary school graduates or illiterates, lower secondary education graduates, high-school graduates, and university graduates. As is common in the relevant literature, we define immigrants as those individuals born outside Greece. 17 Labour market experience is calculated as age minus age of entry in the labour market. 18 We assume that individuals with a lower secondary education or below, secondary education, university education, and post-tertiary education enter the labour market at 17, 19, 23, and 25 years of age, respectively. Following Borjas (2003) we restrict our analysis to individuals with one to 40 years of labour market experience. The four skill categories are grouped into 5-year experience intervals, that is, 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-36 and 36-40 . Consequently, we end up with 32 education by experience cells in each year. Given that female labour force participation is usually not continuous, thereby rendering the estimation of potential experience less precise, our analysis focuses mainly on male individuals aged 15-64. 19 Our key independent variable is the ratio of immigrants in the labour force to the total labour force. More precisely, the immigrant supply shock in each skill-cell is given by = + where and denote, respectively, the number of natives and immigrants in the education-experience cell. Figure 3 shows the supply shocks experienced by different skill groups between 1999 and 2015. As can be seen, the groups experiencing the largest supply shock are those with lower secondary education or below. Usually, the share of immigrants declines with experience in 1999 and 2006. On the other hand, immigration follows an inverted U-shaped pattern in 2015. As for the groups of high-school and university graduates, immigrants are generally more equally distributed across experience groups. Notwithstanding, one important concern 20 to the validity of the skill-cell approach is that the distribution of natives and immigrants across occupations is completely dissimilar. To consider this possibility, we follow Borjas (2003) , Steinhardt (2011) , and Ortega and Verdugo (2014) , and compute Welch's (1999) index of congruence, which is similar to a correlation coefficient. That is, the higher the index, the more equal the occupational distribution is. The index is given by the following relationship:
where ℎ is the proportion of group ℎ (ℎ = , ) employed in occupation , and̄is the labour-force average. As can easily be verified, the results reported in Table 2 suggest that the less-skilled (primary education or below) and the high-skilled (university graduates) native and foreign-born workers are generally clustered into similar occupations within education and experience cells. However, the correlation is significantly lower than the evidence from the United States and France indicates. 21 Interestingly, the most experienced/less educated immigrants and the less experienced/more educated immigrants have a more similar employment distribution. On the other hand, with the exception of the less experienced workers, natives and foreigners with lower secondary education or with a high-school diploma appear to work in different occupational segments. These results are broadly in line with our previous descriptive evidence presented in Table 1 and are supportive of the idea that migrants and natives are not perfect substitutes in the labour market. Hence, our analysis is weakened, though not decisively, by the fact that natives and immigrants with secondary education are not "similar" in Borjas' sense. On balance, however, we can reasonably argue that education-experience cells are, to some extent, the relevant dimension for an analysis in the case of Greece and interpret our results as the lower bound of the true impact of immigration. 22 Before concluding this section, we follow Borjas (2003) and present some simple scatter plots that convey the main results of the present paper. To this purpose, we demean the GRLFS raw data, partially reported in the Appendix, Table 12 - Table 16 . This corresponds to the residuals from regressions of each variable on education, experience, and time dummies. As can be observed in Figure 4 , there is a significant positive relationship between the immigrant share and natives' unemployment rate. On the other hand, the figure indicates a strong negative correlation between migration and natives' employment and average hours worked. By contrast, the flat regression line suggests that there is no significant correlation as regards monthly earnings. Altogether, the first impression is that immigrants displace natives in the Greek labour market. Importantly, there is little variance and the linkage between immigration and the labour market outcomes of natives does not appear to be driven by outlying observations. In the following section, we will test the effects of immigration in detail and in a more formal way.
Empirical Results
In this section, we present our empirical findings using multiple specifications and accounting for a possible downgrading by the education and experience of immigrants to convince the reader that the evidence is reliable.
What is more, we estimate the impact of immigration by employing the mixture approach, that is, a combination of the national approach with spatial correlations, and by distinguishing immigrants according to their years of residence in Greece. We complement our empirical analysis, using the national approach to explore whether immigrants affect the supply of tasks of resident workers. Last but not least, an important empirical exercise involves testing the stability of our findings by pursuing an instrumental variables approach.
Evidence from the National Approach
The first set of empirical results is shown in Table 3 . The dependent variable is the mean value of the employment outcomes of natives across education-experience cells, namely unemployment to labour force, employment to population, weekly average hours worked and monthly earnings. The main explanatory variable is the immigrant share. All variables are calculated using the GRLFS data over the 1999-2015 period. In compliance with the discussion in Section 3, we follow Borjas (2003) and include the full set of possible fixed effects in order to control for omitted variables bias, that is, we use education, experience, and period fixed effects, as well as education by year, experience by year, and education by experience fixed effects. We also report heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors clustered at the education-experience level.
We begin by commenting on the impact of migration on the employment outcomes variables. The first row of Table 3 presents results for the baseline model and indicates that there is significant negative (positive) correlation between immigration and native male employment (unemployment). On the other hand, our estimations do not suggest any significant impact of migration on average hours worked. The discrepancy highlights the potential role of labour market institutions in the effects of immigration. For instance, limited working-time flexibility characterizing the employment relations in Greece (see e.g. Meghir et al. 2017 ) justifies the weak correlation between the immigration share and the average hours worked by natives. 23 On the other hand, the effects of immigration on employment are probably economically important due to the pronounced rigidities of wages prevailing in the Greek economy. The estimated coefficients imply that a 10 % increase in the labour force due to immigration increases native unemployment by 1 % and decreases native employment by 1.5 %. 24 The dependent variable used in each regression is given at the top of the table. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and are adjusted for clustering on education-experience level. All regressions are weighted by the sample size of the education-experience-period cell. All regressions include education, experience, and period fixed effects, as well as interactions between education and experience fixed effects, education and period fixed effects, and experience and period fixed effects. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
In rows (2) and (3), we interact the immigrant share variable with a dummy variable taking value one for the period 1999-2007 and zero otherwise; and a dummy variable taking value one for the 2008-2015 period and zero otherwise, to examine whether the impact of immigration is different before and during the Great Recession. Theoretically, migrants' effects over a period of low economic activity are ambiguous. On the one hand, one would expect that migration affects the labour market outcomes of natives more adversely due to low labour demand. Yet countries during periods of recession usually experience large outflows of migrants and hence the effects might be less severe (D'Amuri and Peri 2014). As mentioned in the introduction, the fact that Greece has undertaken major reforms in recent years to promote labour market flexibility and product market competition, might also have important consequences regarding the effects of immigration during the more recent past. As can be verified, our findings support the first hypothesis, since the estimated coefficients usually appear to be more conservative before a period of Greek crisis. Specifically, the impact on unemployment is about 30 % lower before contraction, while employment is only moderately and insignificantly affected. It should be noted, however, that on the basis of a simple F-test we have to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on immigration share before and during the recession are only identical for the case of employment (and for earnings, discussed below).
The results appear to be robust in terms of the sign of immigration when employing regressions without weights in row (4). Yet the effect on natives' unemployment becomes marginally insignificant at standard levels. In the fifth row, we follow Borjas (2003) and control for the possibility that the immigration share variable is driven by changes in the native workforce. In particular, we add the log of native labour force per skill-cell as a regressor. As can be seen, the results remain quantitatively intact, thereby pointing to the robustness of our baseline specification. Row (6) uses the immigrant share in terms of hours worked per skill-cell instead of labour market participation. A potential advantage of this modification is that it might produce "more exogenous" variation in the immigration variable than labour market participation. The results once again confirm our previous finding, that migrants displace natives in the Greek labour market. Interestingly, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients becomes somewhat stronger while the effect on average hours worked now appears to be significant at the 10 % level.
Row (7) uses the immigrant share in the working age population instead of the immigrant to total labour force ratio. The rationale is that the distribution across skill-cells of migrants who are not in the labour force is more random. Yet, as can be verified, parameter estimates are quite similar to those reported in the baseline specification. Specification (8) accounts for potential attenuation bias. Specifically, we merge years by pairs beginning with 1999/2000 and ending with 2014/2015, in order to increase the sample size per skill-cell as in Edo (2015) . Noticeably, the correlations between immigration and the employment outcomes variables remain very similar to the ones we found in the baseline specification. Consequently, though we cannot draw any definite conclusion, the results reported in rows (7) (8) are indicative of the absence of attenuation bias.
In specification (9), we estimate the partial elasticity of substitution between native and immigrant female workers, employing the gender-specific immigration share as our key independent variable of interest. The estimated coefficients are more conservative and only appear to be significant in the employment equation at the 10 % level. Yet pooling men and women in row (10) verifies that migrants exert a modest but significant adverse effect on natives' employment outcomes.
In rows (11) to (14), we test the sensitivity of our baseline results by: (1) classifying workers into three education groups, namely lower secondary or below, upper secondary and university, (2) distinguishing between two education groups, namely high-school graduates/high-school dropouts and university graduates, (3) grouping workers into four, 10-year experience groups, (4) using age instead of experience bands. Remarkably, as can be easily verified, the results are in the same ballpark as the estimates derived from the baseline specification and are consistent with the idea that there is some degree of substitution between natives and migrants in the Greek labour market.
In rows (15) and (16), we further check the robustness of our findings by re-estimating the regression model excluding employees with a university education and those with less than 10 and more than 30 years of working experience, respectively. Eliminating the more educated workers does not alter the average impact of immigration on indigenous workers. On the other hand, removing young and near retirement individuals may cause the magnitude of the estimated coefficients to increase. This might stem from the fact that this particular group of workers exhibits certain specificities in terms of labour market behavior. For instance, they tend to be less attached to the labour market and hence their participation is likely more sensitive to the immigrant share in the skill groups.
As several previous studies suggest, the transferability of human capital between countries is far from perfect (see e.g. Chiswick 1978; Borjas 1985; Friedberg 2000) . As a result, the allocation of immigrants into skill-cells based on observed levels of educational attainment and work experience might be misleading (see e.g. Dustmann and Preston 2012; Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler 2016) . Hence, in an important robustness check in row (17), we examine whether the results are sensitive to the re-allocation of immigrants into skill-groups according to their effective skills (i.e. skills adjusted for differences in the quality of human capital between the host country and the sending countries). In particular, we impute effective experience and schooling using the methods described in Borjas (2003) and Dustmann and Frattini (2014) . 25 The results reported in Appendix Table 17 suggest that there is considerable heterogeneity in the effects of pre-and post-migration labour market experience, pointing towards the direction that the allocation of migrants in skill-cells needs to be corrected. Similarly, we find that there is a substantial downgrading by education. For instance, after having accounted for effective schooling, the share of high-skilled immigrants (i.e. university graduates) declines from 10 % to 4 %. Yet even after this modification, the effects of immigration are qualitative similar to those presented in row (1). The last two columns of Table 3 illustrate the effect of immigration on log monthly earnings of private-sector employees. 26 Column (4) presents results for all workers who report positive hours worked, while column (5) excludes workers with a low attachment to the labour market, that is, workers with less than 35 weekly hours worked. 27 The rationale is to account for a potential upward bias arising if native workers with a low attachment to the labour market respond to immigration by moving out of employment, as in Bratsberg and Raaum (2012) .
Comparing the results between these two columns, we find that there are no significant discrepancies between the two subsamples. Hence, we can reasonably interpret these findings as suggestive that our analysis is immune to upward bias, in the sense described above. Usually, WLS estimates are consistent across different specifications and indicate that migration reduces the average earnings of native male workers. However, the estimated coefficients are not always significant. In our baseline specification, the implied elasticity for fulltime workers is about -0.10, indicating that a 10 % increase in labour supply due to immigration decreases the wages of male workers by 1 %. With respect to the earnings of native women, there is no evidence of similar significant effects. These results are in line with our expectations, suggesting that wage rigidities prevent the economy from accommodating migrants through wage reductions. 28 Remarkably, the effects of immigration over the period 1999-2007 appear to be 2.3 times as high as those derived during the Great Recession. This result contradicts with the findings suggesting that the impact of immigration on the employment of natives becomes more adverse over the period of depression. A possible explanation for this finding is that the deregulation of the labour market during the crisis might have facilitated the transition of natives towards higher-paid jobs as put forward by Peri and Sparber (2009) . On the other hand, however, this result might signify a reverse causation issue insofar as immigration is correlated with demand shocks. For instance, a declining co-movement of immigration and wages during periods of recession may produce downward bias in the wage equations. 29 We further explore both these issues formally in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, respectively.
Furthermore, it is important to note that, though the pattern is similar to the one we found when employing WLS, the effect of immigration is weaker and loses significance when we run a simple OLS regression. Yet, following the line of reasoning in Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge (2015) , such a discrepancy can be attributed to the fact that WLS estimations place less weight on cells with a small number of observations. Given that the average number of native wage earners per skill-cell is 418 before 2007 and 283 thereafter (due to the dramatic fall of the sample size arising from the huge increase in unemployment), WLS results are probably driven by the fact that the correlation between immigration and native earnings is stronger in the pre-crisis period. By contrast, OLS estimates become insignificant because they give an equal weight to observations before and during the Greek crisis.
Overall, the general picture is that immigration exerts a modest adverse impact on the employment outcomes of natives for the years 1999-2015. On the other hand, though the pattern remains the same, relatively few coefficients appear to be significant as far as average hours and monthly earnings are considered. Importantly, the results are robust across different specifications and hence we can exclude the possibility that they are driven by a particular model specification. Finally, it seems that the capacity of the economy to absorb immigration varies with the business cycle stage and in particular declines, though not dramatically, during periods of weak labour demand.
We now turn to the impact of immigration on natives' employment outcomes using the 1981, 1991, and 2001 surveys of the Population Census. As mentioned above, contrary to the results shown in Table 3 , which reflect the short-run partial impact of immigration, the estimates based on data from decennial censuses capture the long-run effects. The results reported in Table 4 30 suggest that immigration has important consequences for the native labour force. The parameter estimates over the period 1981-2001 are two to three times as high as those derived from the GRLFS. For example, the implied elasticity for unemployment is about 3.5 %. Interestingly, immigration significantly reduces the number of working hours as well. The impact of immigration proves to be robust even when we focus on different subperiods in rows (2-3), though between 1981 and 1991 it is much less precisely estimated. Our findings also remain consistent when using female employees only or when pooling males and females. Since this dataset provides information on immigration by country of birth, as a final exercise we test whether the composition of migration matters. 31 In particular, we re-estimate eq.
(1) allowing the elasticity of substitution to differ according to three broad groups of origin: a) Eastern Europe, (b) developed countries, 32 and (c) rest of the world. The choice of the origin groups is motivated by several reasons, including, among others, culture, education system quality, skill mix, and immigration costs. The first group is mainly driven by Albanian migrants and consists of relatively unskilled workers. The average immigrant from developed countries is more educated than the average native. At the same time, advanced countries score higher than Greece in international competitions assessing school quality such as PISA . Finally, rest of the world primarily involves African and Asian migrants who normally face greater immigration costs and are more culturally distant from Greeks than migrants from the other two groups. Interestingly, the results suggest that only migrants originating from Eastern Europe exert a statistically significant adverse effect on the employment opportunities of the indigenous population. By contrast, albeit in the same direction, estimates for migrants from developed countries and rest of the world become lower in magnitude and insignificant at conventional levels. 33 Taken together, the census-based results appear to be stronger compared to those relying on GRLFS data, implying that the effects of immigration are more important in the long term. Though it is somewhat surprising, however, that discrepancy could possibly be attributed to a potential attenuation bias due to serious measurement error in the latter. 34 A second plausible explanation is that the effect of migrants tends to take place only with a substantial lag, insofar as migrants are imperfect substitutes with natives upon their arrival, while they compete more heavily in the long term, as they acquire country-specific skills (see e.g. Carrasco, Jimeno, and Ortega 2008; Cohen-Goldner and Paserman 2011) . As already discussed in Section 2, the preliminary evidence shown in Table 1 seems to be consistent with this pattern, as migrants' occupational distribution tends to converge with that of natives (though, in no instance fully). We further scrutinize this conjecture formally in Subsection 4.3, by considering differentiated effects on the employment outcomes of natives, according to migrants' tenure in Greece. Lastly, this effect is reinforced by the fact that rigid institutions, as in our case, tend to prolong or even aggravate the adverse effects of immigration (see e.g. Angrist and Kugler 2003) .
Evidence from the Mixture Approach
As discussed in the introduction, regional estimates tend to yield biased towards zero results insofar as migrants settle in regions with booming economic conditions, or natives move away from regions with heavy immigrant concentrations. To consider this possibility, we analyse the effects of immigration on the labour market outcomes employing the mixture approach, that is, a combination of the skill-cell analysis with the spatial correlation approach (see e.g. Borjas 2003; Ortega and Verdugo 2014; Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler 2016) . Since the LFS does not have a sufficient number of observations per regional skill-cell, we are only able to implement this strategy using information from population censuses. To that end, we collapse our data into 13 regions by four education by eight experience cells, ending with 416 cells per year.
In accordance with the aforementioned studies, we report results using different sets of fixed effects to ensure robustness. 35 Specifically, the first column in Table 5 includes region, education, experience, and year fixed effects, as well as region by year, education by year, experience by year, region by education, experience by region, and education by experience fixed effects. Column (2) adds a three-way interaction between region, education, and experience fixed effects, while the third column adds education by experience by year fixed effects. Finally, column (4) includes region by education by year and region by experience by year fixed effects. We also report two set of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors. The first set is adjusted for clustering at the region-education-experience level, and the second at the region-year level.
Somewhat surprisingly, our findings in the first two columns suggest that the impact of immigration is only slightly weaker when adding the regional dimension in the analysis. In particular, using the information from the first column of Table 5 , the correlation between immigration and unemployment (employment) is 29 % (8 %) lower than the one we found using the national approach. By contrast, the results in the remaining columns become significantly smaller. With respect to the effects of immigration on the hours natives worked, the estimated coefficients are in general weaker. x Notes. Each cell contains estimates for the coefficient of the immigrant share variable from a separate regression where the dependent variable is the mean labour market outcome for a native skill group. Two sets of heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The first is adjusted for clustering on region-education-experience level and the second on region-year level. The regression on monthly wage has 5,234 observations; the regression on unemployment to labour force has 5,580 observations; the regression on employment to population has 5,595 observations; the regressions on average hours have 5,555 observations. x denotes that it is included as a regressor in model. * p < 0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Impact of Immigrants according to Their Tenure in Greece
The analysis so far has been based on the conjecture that the partial elasticity of substitution between natives and migrants does not vary with the level of newcomers' experience in the Greek labour market. In this section, we relax this assumption and modify eq. (1), splitting the immigrant share by years of residence in Greece, to provide further insight as to whether the effects of migration vary with the assimilation process. More precisely, immigrants with four or fewer years' residence, between 5 and 9 years, and with 10 or more years, are plugged in eq.
(1), in order to consider this possibility. As argued by Cohen-Goldner and Paserman (2011), Carrasco, Jimeno, and Ortega (2008) , among others, it is not clear whether new or old migrants compete more heavily with natives. On the one hand, recently arrived immigrants and native workers should be regarded as imperfect substitutes insofar as human capital is not perfectly transferable across countries. However, in the medium and long term, migrants are more likely to be close substitutes for natives, as they accumulate country-specific skills. By contrast, as suggested by Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014) and Moreno-Galbis and Tritah (2016), new migrants' readiness to work at lower wages causes firms to open more vacancies and hence their effect might be modest relative to that of already established migrants. Table 6 illustrates the effects of immigrants with different tenure in Greece. As can be seen, migrants with 10 or more years since arrival appear to significantly deteriorate the employment outcomes of natives. Furthermore, migrants with more than 5 and less than 9 years in Greece exert a negative and significant influence on male earnings. By contrast, the evidence indicates imperfect substitution between migrants with little experience in Greece and natives. As for females, neither the unassimilated migrants nor those with intermediate local experience exert a significant impact. Yet, we find that the share of veteran migrants is negatively and significantly correlated with employment. Lastly, the general picture is the same when pooling men and women, though the results are slightly weaker. Notes. The table reports the impact of immigration on the labour market outcomes of natives by years of residence in Greece. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering on education-experience level. All regressions are weighted by the sample size of the education-experience-period cell. All regressions include education, experience, and period fixed effects, as well as interactions between education and experience fixed effects, education and period fixed effects, and experience and period fixed effects. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.
All in all, the results are consistent with the descriptive evidence previously reported in Table 1 , which shows that migrants' occupational distribution tends to converge to that of natives as they accumulate experience in Greece. As a result, natives and veteran migrants are more likely to compete for the same jobs within the skillcells and hence the effects are detected after a considerable length of time. However, we note that this result might also reflect that the skill-cell analysis simply performs better in the case of veteran migrants, given the important differences in occupations of natives and recent immigrants with similar education levels.
The Impact of Immigration on the Task Performance of Natives
Up to this point, we have analysed the relationship between immigration and the labour market opportunities of natives and found that the employment outcomes of natives are modestly affected by migrant workers. Yet, as discussed in the introduction, more recently, the focus has been on the correlation between immigration and the supply of tasks by natives. In particular, the seminal study by Peri and Sparber (2009) suggests that as migration increases, US natives tend to leave manual occupations for complementary occupations, which require cognitive and language skills. Along these lines, several previous studies find supportive evidence within the European context (see e.g. Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica 2011; D'Amuri; Peri 2014; Ortega and Verdugo 2014). However, as discussed in D'Amuri and Peri (2014) , 36 this mechanism is country-specific and varies with the degree of labour market flexibility. For instance, a stringent employment protection legislation could hinder upward occupational mobility. Based on these considerations, we employ the skill-cell approach to investigate whether Greek natives protect themselves from immigrant competitors via a positive occupational reallocation (i.e. by moving towards complex, language-intensive tasks). Similar to Ortega and Verdugo (2014) , who examine the nexus between immigration and the task specialization of natives in France, we employ data on task measures from Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2010) . 37 Following Peri and Sparber (2009) and Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica (2011), we focus on recent immigrants (i.e. those with 5 years residence or less in Greece). The underlying assumption is that newly arrived migrants tend to occupy manual jobs due to limited language proficiency. 38 To this purpose, we regress routine task intensity, abstract, routine, and service task importance on the immigrant share variable and the usual set of education, experience, and year fixed effects. 39 As discussed in Section 2, routine task intensity is defined as routine task importance weighted by the sum of abstract and the importance of the service. Routine task importance is the average of the routine task content within occupations. Likewise, abstract and service importance corresponds to the average abstract and service task content, respectively. Notes. Each cell contains estimates for the coefficient of the immigrant share variable from a separate regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering on education-experience level. All regressions are weighted by the sample size of the education-experience-period cell. All regressions include education, experience, and period fixed effects, as well as interactions between education and experience fixed effects, education and period fixed effects, and experience and period fixed effects. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Analysis based on the census data (Panel A) suggests that immigration exerts a significant negative influence on routine task intensity during the 1980s and the 1990s, thereby corroborating existing studies. Remarkably, the correlation appears to be stronger when the task performance of native women is considered. In all instances, there is a positive (negative) association between immigration and the supply of abstract (routine) tasks. On the other hand, men decrease and women increase the supply of service tasks in response to immigration. When employing the GRLFS data (Panel B), though immigration has a weaker significant impact, in most cases the sign pattern of the estimated coefficients remains unchanged. The results again confirm our prior finding that immigrants push natives towards complementary tasks in which they have a comparable advantage. As already discussed above, a potential explanation for the weakly significant effects might be measurement error in our independent variable of interest. Yet it is important to note that the fact the impact of immigration is found to be significant even in this case, reinforces the validity of our conclusion that natives and immigrants are imperfect substitutes in the Greek labour market. A further explanation for this finding is that occupational mobility is a long-run process which a time series of decennial censuses are more able to capture.
Yet, the most interesting set of empirical results is shown in the last two rows of this table, where we distinguish between the pre-and the post-2008 period. As can be verified, the correlations between immigration and the supply of tasks of natives are not statistically different from zero over the period [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . By contrast, during the recession, the estimated coefficients become significant and the evidence suggests that natives tend to specialize in less routine tasks in cells with heavy immigrant concentrations. Bearing in mind that the process of positive occupational re-allocation is assisted by flexible labour market institutions, the discrepancy between the two periods considered in this exercise can possibly be attributed to increased flexibility, resulted from the structural reforms implemented under the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Greece and its creditors. For example, the strictness of employment protection, which according to D'Amuri and Peri (2014) plays the most important role in facilitating occupational transitions, fell significantly, near the OECD average during this period (see e.g. http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/-oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm). Importantly, this finding might also explain why the earnings of natives are only modestly affected by immigration during the recession. We can reasonably assume that increased labour market flexibility has displayed a moderating role, helping natives protect their wages from foreign-born competitors, as originally suggested by D'Amuri and Peri (2014).
Reverse Causality
As already discussed above, the skill-cell approach is less likely to suffer from the potential self-selection of natives as compared to the early spatial correlations. However, the correlations presented above might still be spurious, unless migrants cluster into cells in a non-random way. It might also be the case of unobserved education-experience shocks correlated with the employment outcomes of natives as well as with the distribution migrants across the skilled defined segments of the labour market. To address potential reverse causality, we resort to an instrumental variables approach, adopting the "shift-share" methodology popularized by Card (2001) . This approach is intended to eliminate contemporaneous correlation by exploiting the historical allocation of migrants across labour markets. It rests on the premise that migrant networks play an important role in the settlement decision of current migrants (see e.g. Bartel 1989 ). In order to build our instrument, we proceed as follows. First, we impute immigration, multiplying the distribution of migrants in 1991 40 across skill-cells by their yearly nationwide stock over the period 1999-2015:
where , stands for the national-level stock of immigrants from country c and year t, and
is the 1991 share of the foreign-born population from country c who belong to the education group i and the experience group j. The 1991 share comes from our census data. The stock of immigrants by country of origin at the national level was downloaded from the United Nations database. 41 We then obtain our shift-share instrument as follows:̂= ∑∑̂+ŵ herêstands for the predicted stock of natives across skill-cells over time (i.e. computed in an analogous way as the predicted stock of their migrant counterparts).
The validity of our approach is established by the first-stage results which are shown below the estimated coefficients in Table 8 and Table 9 . As can be easily verified, our shift-share instrument enters with a positive, highly significant coefficient across specifications. Likewise, the F-tests are always far above the rule of thumb of 10, indicating that our instrument is a strong predictor of the allocation of migrants across education-experience cells over the period under scrutiny. Lastly, it is important to highlight, that a potential threat to the validity of the "shift-share" methodology is that the instrument might be correlated with current economic shocks due to persistence of shocks (see e.g. Dustmann, Fabbri, and Preston 2005) . However, the orthogonality condition of the instrument is expected to be met with a great deal of certainty for the case of Greece, since economic conditions have changed dramatically over the period from 1999 onwards. In particular, the preparations for the adoption of euro in 2001 and the subsequent economic expansion (until 2008) represent a clear shift in the structure of the economy. What is more, as discussed above, the allocation of migrants in 1991 were sudden and quite random, thereby implying that the instrument has no effect on the employment outcomes considered as the dependent variables in this study. On balance, we argue that building our instrument on the distribution of migrants 8 years before the period considered in our estimations is sufficient to satisfy the restriction that the instrument is orthogonal to the error term. 42 Table 8 : Impact of immigrant share on the employment outcomes of natives per skill-cell, 2SLS estimates using the "shiftshare" imputed instrument. Sample I: Greek Labour Force Survey 1999-2015. Notes. 2SLS estimates for the coefficient of the immigrant share variable. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering on education-experience level. All regressions are weighted by the sample size of the education-experience-period cell. All regressions include education, experience, and period fixed effects, as well as interactions between education and experience fixed effects, education and period fixed effects, and experience and period fixed effects. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Table 9 : Impact of immigrant share on the supply of tasks of natives per skill-cell, 2SLS estimates using the "shift-share" imputed instrument. Sample I: Greek Labour Force Survey 1999-2015.
Specification

Routine task intensity
Abstract task importance
Routine task importance
Service task importance Notes. 2SLS estimates for the coefficient of the immigrant share variable. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering on education-experience level. All regressions are weighted by the sample size of the education-experience-period cell. All regressions include education, experience, and period fixed effects, as well as interactions between education and experience fixed effects, education and period fixed effects, and experience and period fixed effects. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Table 8 considers the impact of immigration on the labour market outcomes of natives, whereas Table 9 offers the results related to effects on the supply of tasks. As we observe from the first row in Table 8 , the estimated effects on the employment outcomes remain qualitatively intact, though the coefficients appear to increase in magnitude. Notably, the coefficient on immigration in the average hours worked equation now becomes significant at the 5 % level. We interpret these findings as providing evidence that migrants are indeed selfselected into cells where the employment prospects are more favourable. On the other hand, the effects on earnings become much weaker and not statistically different from zero at conventional levels. The remaining rows show coefficient estimates for the immigrant share variable from regressions before and during the Greek crisis. As shown above, this is done by introducing the interaction between immigration and dummy variables for each of these periods analysed. As is common in the literature, the shift-share instrument is also interacted with the period dummies. With the exception of average hours, the reported evidence reinforces our earlier conclusions that the effects of immigration become more adverse during the recession. Importantly, though the effects on earnings are close to zero, the sign pattern of the coefficients on immigration changes into the opposite direction as compared to the one obtained using simple fixed effects estimates. More precisely, the association between immigration and native wages appears to be positive before recession and negative during it.
As regards the supply of task, comparing the results in the first row of Table 9 with the ones we found in Table 7 for male natives, we observe once again that our instrumental variables approach yields much stronger results. However, the effects remain similar in qualitative terms, implying that migrants trigger a reallocation of natives towards less routine tasks. Importantly, the contribution of immigration appears to be economically more important over the more recent past.
Concluding Remarks
Recent developments in the empirical literature of immigration have challenged the notion from the earlier "spatial correlations" that the effects of immigration are clustered around zero. Motivated by the seminal paper of Borjas (2003) , several studies have then reported conflicting results. Along those lines, this paper explores, for the first time, the labour market consequences of immigration in Greece. Exploiting decennial data over the period 1981-2001 and annual data for years 1999-2015, we find a negative (positive), statistically significant effect of migration on the employment (unemployment) of natives. The results survive several tests of robustness, related to alternative definitions of the skill groups, sample restrictions, potential downgrading of immigrants by experience and education and endogeneity.
By contrast, we find that the impact of migrants on average hours worked and the earnings of private-sector employees are weak (and not always significant). Interestingly, our analysis also suggests that there is a positive correlation between immigration and the supply of non-routine tasks by natives. This result, however, is only consistently found over the 2008-2015 period. Bearing in mind that occupational mobility is theoretically linked to increased labour market flexibility, we cannot exclude the possibility that the labour market deregulation undertaken during that same period might have significantly contributed towards this direction.
To put things into perspective, these findings differ appreciably from those reported by Borjas (2003) as the adjustment of the labour market comes through a reduction of employment rather than of earnings. On the other hand, they are broadly consistent with Glitz's (2012) and Edo's (2015) estimations for the case of Germany and France, respectively. Of course, this discrepancy highlights the importance of labour market institutions when considering the partial effects of immigration-driven supply shocks. Rigid institutions prevailing in many European countries may prevent the adjustment of wages at the expense of employment as opposed to the US case. Interestingly, however, the elasticities of substitution between native and foreign-born workers found in this study are more substantial than the ones reported in Angrist and Kugler (2003) for a panel of European countries, implying that Greece represents a special case within Europe.
On balance, however, the results are far from being suggestive that underlying Greece's unemployment problems is immigration. Considering the limitations of this study, a general equilibrium approach, in the spirit of Ottaviano and Peri (2012) , might suggest even less important effects of immigration. All in all, this paper marks the need for considering additional changes in the structure of the Greek economy to combat unemployment and promote labour market efficiency, rather than following the Malthusian rationale in immigration policy. For example, one of the most significant findings to emerge from the present study is that facilitating mobility between occupations should be a priority for policymakers. Table 10 : Bilateral correlations between the key variables used in the paper. 
B Appendix
Calculating effective skills for migrants Let denotes age of entry in Greece and age of entry into the labour market. In the fashion of Borjas (2003) , 43 we distinguish between immigrants who migrated as adults (i.e. < ), and as children (i.e. ≤ ). Adult migrants' labour market experience is assumed to be given by the sum of pre-( − ) and a post-migration ( − ) experience. On the other hand, child migrants only have experience acquired abroad ( − ). We weigh experience by the unknown factors α, β and γ in order to account for potential downgrading. Formally, effective experience for each of the two immigrant groups is then given by the following relationship:
To estimate the weights, we run the following generic assimilation regression: 44
where is a vector of education fixed effects, and indicate whether the immigrant entered the country as a child and as adult, respectively, N indicates whether the worker is native-born, Y are cohort of immigration dummies and are period fixed effects. The weights are then calculated as follows:
.The results reported in Table 17 indicate that experience acquired in Greece is almost equally valued by Greek employers. In contrast, the value of pre-immigration experience is much lower. Applying the information from this table in the above formulas, we find that the values , and are 0.2, 1.2, and 0.9, respectively. Using the estimated weights, we then compute the effective experience and adjust the immigrant share accordingly. Given that we almost fully eliminate source country experience, immigration counts fall dramatically in high experience cells. 2015-2011, 2010-2006, 2005-2001, 2000-1996, 1995-1991, 1990-1986, 1985-1981, and before 1981) , and the interaction of this vector with a dummy variable indicating whether the immigrant arrived as an adult. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
To control for a potential downgrading by education, we follow Dustmann and Frattini (2014) and impute to each intermediate or high-skilled immigrant who arrived as an adult the year-specific average level of education of natives in the same occupation (we use the two-digit ISCO88 occupation classification), assuming that the unemployed form an extra occupational group. As can be seen in Table 18 , the imputed shares of high-school and university graduates are far lower than the observed ones. As a result, immigrants are over-represented in the group of workers with lower secondary education. Finally, Figure 5 reports the observed against the adjusted for effecting experience and schooling immigrant share. The effect on working hours may also be reinforced by the insensitivity of earnings to immigration (which we discuss below), as long as the labour supply decision is closely related to earnings.
24 The results are converted into elasticities by multiplying the estimated coefficients by 1/(1 + ) 2 , where = / is the mean value of the share of immigrants during the period under consideration (8.93 %) . The elasticities reported in the main text are then given by 0.120 × 0.84 and −0.180 × 0.84. See Borjas (2003) for more details. 25 The procedures followed to calculate the effective skills of immigrants are discussed in detail in Appendix B. Figure 5 depicts the actual against the imputed immigrant shares per skill-cell. 26 We also experimented with earnings data from the European Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EUSILC), but the estimates are not precise because of the small sample size per skill-cell. 27 In their empirical analyses, Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2008) , Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Bratsberg et al. (2014) also report separate estimates from samples including and excluding part-time workers. 28 To further explore the robustness of the wage equations, we have also experimented by considering three extreme cases for the highest income bracket, in the spirit of Christopoulou and Monastiriotis (2014) , that is, by eliminating these observations or by setting the upper limit at 3,000 or 5,000 euros. Even after these amendments, the results still imply that the impact of immigration on natives' earnings is weak. 29 We wish to thank an anonymous referee for bringing this issue to our attention. 30 To save space, we present only the results of the baseline 4 × 8 skill-cells model. To check the robustness of our main findings, we also run regressions with alternative specifications as in Table 3 . The results are remarkably very similar to those in Table 4 and are available upon request. 31 A similar strategy had been previously followed in the immigration literature by Bratsberg et al. (2014) , Dimant, Krieger, and Redlin (2015) and Edo (2015) . 32 Namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 33 Note, however, that these differences should be interpreted with caution, since it is not clear whether they capture a different type of interaction in the actual economy between different groups of workers or rather that for certain groups of workers the hypotheses underlying the methodology are more valid than for other groups. In particular, it might be the case that the hypothesis on the validity of education and experience as the relevant dimension to determine whether natives and immigrants are similar or not works more or less well for different groups of immigrants. 34 Indeed, a comparison between our Census and GRLFS data in 2001 suggests that the latter severely underestimates the number of working-age migrants. Specifically, according to the census, the number of migrants is estimated to be 794,900. On the other hand, the GRLFS yields a figure of 416,643 migrants. By contrast, the GRLFS overstates the number of natives (6, 752, 859 ) as compared to the census (6, 037, 320) . 35 The results are obtained using the command reghdfe in STATA. 36 See also the discussion in Peri (2014) . 37 The task measures are calculated with O*NET data, and then are converted into ISCO level. The relative values are reported in Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2010, Table 4, p.49) . 38 The results (not reported) when using the general immigrant share are very similar, though somewhat weaker, to those reported in Table 7 . 39 Pairwise correlations (reported in the Appendix Table 10) suggest that routine task intensity declines with years of work experience, albeit the correlation between the variables is very low. On the other hand, there is a strong negative correlation between routine task intensity and the university education dummy. A similar pattern emerges in D'Amuri and Peri (2014) for a panel of 15 Western European countries. 40 To further strengthen our identification strategy, we have also experimented by building our instrument employing 1981 as the reference year. Unfortunately, however, because of the relatively short immigration history in Greece (i.e. the first important episode took place in the early 1990s), the 1981 share of migrants did not turn out a significant predictor of the distribution of migrants across skill-cells over the 1999-2015 period. 41 Available at: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml To construct our instrument, we aggregate immigrants into 9 broad origin groups: Africa, Americas, Australia and New Zealand, Asia, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Western Asia, Western Europe and other countries. 42 We also note that in a similar empirical exercise, D'Amuri and Peri (2014) 
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